CORPORATE DEADLOCK RESOLUTION THROUGH CONTRACTUAL EXIT MECHANISMS IN JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES
Abstract
Corporate deadlock represents one of the most significant challenges in joint-stock company governance, particularly in closely held corporations where shareholders possess equal voting power. This article examines the role of contractual exit mechanisms as preventive and remedial solutions to deadlock situations. Drawing on corporate law scholarship and practical experience from various jurisdictions, this paper analyzes how shareholders' agreements, buy-sell provisions, and other contractual arrangements can facilitate orderly exits and preserve enterprise value when decision-making paralysis occurs.
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